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Football clubs on the Stock Exchange: an inappropriate match? 
 
The case of Celtic plc 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Focusing on the case of Celtic plc, this paper questions the extent to which Stock 
Exchange listed companies are appropriate vehicles for contemporary football 
clubs. It adopts an inclusive or stakeholder approach to ownership, focusing not 
only on the providers of capital as owners but also on the ownership rights of a 
football club’s community. The paper argues in favour of ownership structures 
which more fully capture both the economic and social aspects of contemporary 
football clubs. It concludes by discussing alternative options for the ownership 
and governance of football clubs, considering in particular structures based on 
mutual and co-operative principles.  
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‘Following the approach by BT Wolfensohn, the financial advisers to a 
consortium which includes the venture capitalists BT Capital Partners 
Europe, Kenny Dalglish, Jim Kerr and others (together, the ‘Consortium’), 
the Board of Celtic plc has, after careful consideration with its advisers 
Greig Middleton & Co. Limited and Nomura International plc, concluded 
that the Consortium’s proposals are not in the best interests of the ordinary 
and preference shareholders of Celtic. 
The Board remains of the view that it is in the best long-term interests of 
Celtic for Mr McCann’s shareholding to be offered to existing 
shareholders and season-book holders of Celtic and to other individual 
investors who are keenly interested in the long-term success of Celtic.’ 
(Announcement to the London Stock Exchange by the Board of Celtic plc,  
18 December 1998) 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
As has been well documented, the 1990s has seen football plc welcomed onto 
the Stock Exchange. As of May 1999 there are 21 clubs listed on the London 
market: 14 on the Official List and seven on the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM). To date the amount raised by clubs which have floated totals £167m. At 
30 June 1998 market capitalisation for listed clubs was £1,063m, down from a 
peak of £1,899m (Deloitte & Touche, 1998). Market listing for clubs is also 
becoming more usual in other European countries. Clubs are now listed in 
Denmark, Italy and Holland. It is also expected that German clubs such as 
Bayern Munich and Borussia Dortmund will shortly seek market listings.  
 
However, it is often asserted that football is more than just a business. In this 
paper the stakeholder concept is utilised to provide a fuller understanding of the 
nature of contemporary football clubs. The paper addresses issues of ownership 
within football clubs, focusing not only on providers of capital as owners but 
also on other stakeholder groups who, it is argued, have proprietary claims. 
Notwithstanding the recent trend of clubs having their shares listed on the Stock 
Exchange, the paper continues by questioning the extent to which Stock 
Exchange listed companies are the appropriate vehicles for contemporary 
football clubs. In particular it focuses on the case of Celtic plc. Implications 
arising out of its market listing and proposed changes in the ownership of Celtic 
plc are used to consider the case for alternative forms of organisational structure 
for Celtic in particular, and for football clubs more generally. 
 
THE STAKEHOLDER CONCEPT 
 
In studies into the objectives of football clubs carried out in the 1970s and 1980s 
it was fairly common to describe clubs as utility maximisers, seeking to 
maximise playing success while remaining solvent (Sloane 1971, 1980; 
Sutherland and Haworth, 1986; Arnold and Benveniste, 1987). However, it has 
been argued that football’s rush to the capital market place has brought with it a 
more shareholder-centric focus and a greater emphasis on the generation of profit 
and the maximisation of shareholder value (Conn, 1997, p. 154, Lee, 1999, p. 
86). The floating of football clubs on the Stock Exchange has led to less 
concentrated ownership structures at many clubs (Morrow, 1999, pp. 78-83). 
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This in turn has led to improved governance as directors have been obliged to 
recognise the rights of other shareholders (Morrow, 1999, p. 87). Interestingly, 
however, as football has focused more on maximisation of shareholder value and 
the concomitant accountability to shareholders, much of the focus in wider 
political and business communities has been on alternative and more inclusive 
models of corporate behaviour and governance. 
 
The most commonly discussed alternative model of corporate governance and 
behaviour is the stakeholder model. A stakeholder can be defined as ‘any group 
or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s 
objectives’ (Freeman, 1984). While most commentators would argue that a 
company’s stakeholders would typically include its management, employees, 
customers, suppliers, owners, competitors and the community (however 
defined), critics argue that the definition is so wide that it includes practically 
everyone, everything, everywhere (Sternberg, 1998, p. 94). Two key aspects of 
stakeholder theory are, first, that corporations are accountable to all their 
stakeholders, and second, that a major objective of management is to balance the 
conflicting demands of the various stakeholders in the corporation (Ansoff, 
1987, p. 51).  
 
The stakeholder model was integral to the 1995 inquiry by the Royal Society for 
the Encouragement of Arts, Commerce and Manufactures into Tomorrow’s 
Company (RSA, 1995). It concluded that financial success for tomorrow’s 
company is dependent on the adoption of an inclusive approach to business, one 
which focuses on all stakeholder relationships, not just those with shareholders. 
This is akin to the notion of a stakeholder economy espoused by Tony Blair. 
Drawing on the ideas of such as Will Hutton (Hutton, 1995) and John Kay (Kay, 
1993), the Blair vision is of an inclusive society and economy in which all social 
groups have a stake in the wellbeing of corporations and the national economy.  
 
FOOTBALL’S STAKEHOLDERS 
 
It can be argued that the stakeholder concept has greater relevance for football 
clubs than for more conventional business organisations because of the particular 
features of certain football club stakeholders, specifically their demands for 
accountability. Consideration is required in particular of a club’s direct or 
traditional community, namely its supporters, and of a wider notion of 
community encompassing people and groups affected by the existence of a 
football club within their environment. While this broader community is most 
commonly defined in terms of geography, it might also include religious or 
social dimensions. 
 
Supporters as Stakeholders 
 
The importance of supporters in this stakeholder model of football clubs has 
been recognised by several authors (Conn, 1997; King, 1997; Lee, 1999; 
Morrow, 1999). The traditional notion of a club’s supporters has been to view 
them as the club’s community. Perhaps the best analogy is with a church. A 
church is more than a physical building: it is a community of people who come 
together to worship, i.e. the worshippers become the church. Traditionally the 
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relationship between a football team, the stadium and the supporters has been 
something similar: together they become the club.  
 
As mentioned earlier it has been argued that the incorporation of football has 
been accompanied by a more shareholder-centric focus, with a greater emphasis 
being placed on the generation of profit and the maximisation of shareholder 
value. Along with these changes, it has become frequent to refer to supporters as 
customers. This notion of supporters as customers reduces football to free market 
economics: people will pay more for better services. The logic of the customer 
applies equally to ticket pricing, the price of merchandising or whatever. Taken 
to its rational conclusion the supporter as a customer even has the choice of 
which team to support. The customer gets what he pays for: the rights of 
supporters are restricted to the economic rights of non-purchase. 
 
Supporters are obviously important to clubs in economic terms whether through 
purchasing season tickets, merchandising or whatever. However, there are strong 
arguments which suggest that the ‘customer’ description of the relationship 
between supporters and clubs is not adequate. In economic terms it is incomplete 
because it fails to consider the role played by the supporters in creating the 
product that they are asked to buy - i.e. football supporters are asked to buy what 
they themselves are helping to create, the spectacle of support (King, 1997). 
More importantly, in social and political terms, the concept of the customer fails 
to capture the idea of a supporter’s identity with a club. The sense of attachment 
between a supporter and his or her club is usually very strong. In addition, the 
relationship is usually a long-term relationship, although there is some evidence 
to suggest that changing club attachments may be increasing in the new 
generation of fans in the FA Premier League (SNCCFR, 1997). Nevertheless for 
most supporters supporting a football club is like membership of a particular 
church or faith - conversion is possible but happens fairly infrequently (Morrow, 
1999, p. 168).  
 
Stakeholder theory holds that the strategies adopted by managers should enable 
them to manage those stakeholder relationships which are most crucial to the 
corporation’s success (Roberts, 1998). Accordingly the management of this key 
relationship with supporters should be seen as crucial to the success of the 
football company. 
 
The Community as a Stakeholder 
 
In the UK professional sporting organisations have a deep-rooted identification 
with a particular city or region and hence community. The importance of clubs 
can be both economic and sentimental. Clubs can act as focal points for 
communities, something to rally around and bring people together, whether at 
times of success such as a Cup run, or at times of difficulty such as when a club 
is threatened by financial problems. Football clubs can also be a way of 
promoting a town or area. Even normally impassive banks are susceptible to the 
notion of football clubs as community resources, with evidence to suggest that 
lending decisions made by banks are not always made on commercial grounds 
(Morrow, 1997a). 
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The RSA Inquiry’s vision of Tomorrow’s Company (RSA, 1995) recognised the 
importance of a company’s community.  
 
Tomorrow’s company recognises its interdependence with the community in 
which it operates. It develops leadership strategies which strengthen both the 
climate for business success and the community itself.  
 
The importance of community was also recognised in a football context in the 
report commissioned by the Football Association on ‘Football – its Values, 
Finances and Reputation’ (Smith, 1997). The report included a draft Code of 
Conduct for football clubs which identified two challenges in terms of a club’s 
community: firstly, to demonstrate that it is a vital part of its community, and 
secondly, to remember that community role when making decisions.  
 
On an ongoing basis, however, many clubs are remote from anything other than 
their direct community of supporters. Rather than the club being a source of 
leisure or recreational facilities within a community, many local residents are 
likely to view a football club as something which brings inconvenience to their 
normal life at every home match. This could range from traffic chaos through to 
uncivilised individual and group behaviour (and possibly also hooliganism) 
being brought closer to them than they would wish. Given the deep-rooted 
identification that exists between football clubs and their communities more 
could be done by clubs to adopt an inclusive approach to those communities. 
Many suggestions have been put forward as to how clubs can overcome their 
remoteness from the wider community, ranging from the use of training facilities 
as sports centres through to using the grounds for things like Mother and Toddler 
classes (Morrow, 1999, p. 193; Perryman, 1998). One model for football is the 
way in which churches have found an important role to play in communities, 
seven days a week. This is particularly significant given that most churches, 
unlike football clubs at present, have to deal with a dwindling direct community 
in terms of falling congregations.  
 
A Critique of the Stakeholder Model 
 
The stakeholder concept is appealing as it captures more fully the nature of 
football clubs and the groups who can affect or are affected by the achievement 
of the club’s objectives. But the concept is not without its problems, chief of 
which centres on actually defining the objectives of football clubs. However, it is 
argued that this problem is also relevant in the wider corporate environment. 
Sternberg (1998) suggests that according to stakeholder theory there is only one 
legitimate organisational objective: balanced stakeholder benefits. However, this 
objective is accompanied by three problems: first, a lack of guidance as to how 
stakeholder groups should be selected, second, a failure to explain what should 
count as a benefit for the purposes of balancing benefits, and third, a lack of 
guidance on how the balance should be struck.  
 
It has been argued that, prior to becoming Stock Exchange listed companies, 
football clubs could be assumed to have a unitary objective - playing success 
subject to a solvency constraint. For example, McMaster (1997) argues that 
everyone at a club from the board of directors to the players and coaching staff is 
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interested in maximising their utility, a factor dependent to some extent on 
relative playing success. This view was not universally shared. In a paper on the 
operation of the retain and transfer system, Stewart (1986) argued that the 
existence of this system, which operated to restrict players’ labour market 
mobility, was recognition of the fact that without it players would operate in a 
manner consistent with the pursuit of their own rather than their employers’ 
objectives. Post-Bosman1 players are now much freer to operate in a manner 
consistent with their own objectives rather than their employers’ objectives. 
This, however, is no different from the situation that other organisations find 
themselves in. 
 
In the new business of football the objective of supporters remains the attainment 
of football success. Contemporary football clubs, in particular those clubs which 
are listed on the Stock Exchange, face particular problems where other 
stakeholders have different, and often conflicting objectives. For example, where 
the club’s shareholders are not drawn exclusively from the club’s supporters, 
then the investment motives of at least some of these shareholders will be in 
terms of earning a financial return. As the following quote illustrates, whether 
the discussion is in terms of balancing the benefits to stakeholders or balancing 
the objectives of stakeholders, for Stock Exchange listed companies such as 
Manchester United, conflict is almost inevitable. 
 
As for the suggestion from City analysts that [Manchester] United should give 
its extra money [a cash surplus of £39m reported in its 1997 accounts] back to 
shareholders, Mitten’s response [Andy Mitten, editor of United We Stand, a 
Manchester United supporters’ fanzine] highlights the shareholder-supporter 
divide that runs through all stock market-quoted clubs. 
He says: ‘These profits have come out of the fans’ pockets, in the form of gate 
receipts, merchandising and television revenue, yet they end up going to some 
anonymous, faceless investor in the City? That’s not right.’ 
(City eyes United’s cash hoard, The Financial Times 21 November 1997) 
 
For Stock Exchange listed clubs such as Manchester United, the adoption of an 
inclusive or stakeholding approach may seem like little more than an idle dream. 
Nevertheless, various suggestions have been put forward to try to deal with this 
conflict and to encourage a more inclusive approach to business, such as the 
creation of some sort of regulatory structure which would protect the rights of 
supporter-stakeholders (Football Task Force, 1999; Hamil, 1999; Perryman, 
1998). Perhaps of greater significance is the decision taken in April 1999 by the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Stephen Byers, to follow the advice of 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and reject BSkyB’s bid for 
Manchester United (a bid supported by the directors but rejected by many 
stakeholder groups)2, a decision which may prove to be a watershed for 
governance of football in the UK. 
 
In this paper, however, the focus is on alternative types of ownership structure 
which may more fully capture the nature of a football club and its stakeholders. 
These alternative ownership structures are of relevance given that the 
philosophical antecedents of stakeholder theory reach back to the 19th Century, 
to the conceptions of the co-operative movement and mutuality (Clarke, 1998). 
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These alternative ownership structures will be discussed after a consideration of 
the case of Celtic plc. 
 
THE CASE OF CELTIC PLC: A MODEL FOR CHANGE? 
 
In this section governance, accountability and the ownership framework of 
contemporary football clubs will be considered using the example of Celtic plc. 
Celtic is a good example for many reasons: it is listed on the main market of the 
Stock Exchange, it is one of the largest British clubs in terms of market 
capitalisation, it has strong links with its community, it has a high number of 
supporter shareholders and most importantly of all it is undergoing changes to its 
ownership structure, with plans by the club’s chairman to dispose of his majority 
holding in the club to supporters and season-book holders.  
 
The official centenary history of Celtic, written by the Labour MP Brian Wilson, 
begins by noting that the club was established for reasons closely related to Irish 
identity and Catholic charity (Wilson, 1988, p. 1). Founded in 1888 by a Marist 
Brother, Brother Walfrid, the club’s principal objective was to raise money to 
provide food for the poor in the East End of Glasgow. From these charitable 
origins Celtic went on to become the first British club to win the European Cup 
in 1967. To this day the club continues to have its roots deep in the Glasgow 
Irish community from whose descendants it still draws much of its support. 
 
While conscious of the club’s history and the importance to its community, the 
club’s current directors have worked hard to present Celtic as a non-sectarian, 
Scottish institution. This is clear from the club’s Social Mission statement which 
states that: 
 
Celtic Football Club is a Scottish football club with proud Irish links. The 
primary business of Celtic is as a football club. It is run on a professional 
basis with no political agenda. However, the Club has a wider role and the 
responsibility of being a major Scottish social institution promoting health, 
well being and social integration. 
 
The club’s charitable objectives and acknowledgement of its community role are 
explicitly referred to in its annual report. 
 
Celtic Football Club is committed to supporting the community and is proud 
today that it strives to honour the charitable objectives of the Club’s founders. 
Celtic plc Annual Report year ended 30 June 1998 3 
 
It is interesting to contrast the history of Celtic with that of another famous 
European football club, the Spanish club Barcelona. While Celtic was formed at 
least in part to help preserve the identity of the incoming Irish in Glasgow, by 
contrast Barcelona, although founded by foreigners (mostly British and Swiss 
residents), quickly assumed the main objectives of Catalan society (L’Elefant 
Blau, 1999). Nevertheless despite the different community focus of the two 
clubs, what is clear is that since their foundation over 100 years ago both clubs 
have continued to play an important role within their communities, a point that 
will be returned to later in this paper.  
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Fergus McCann became the owner of Celtic in March 1994, taking over a club 
which was beset with internal disputes and shareholder and supporter unrest and 
had been within eight minutes of being put into liquidation. He provided an 
immediate cash guarantee to stabilise the company’s borrowings, following this 
up with a rights issue and other subscriptions which raised in aggregate over 
£12m for the company, eliminating bank and other major debts.  
 
Part of McCann’s strategy for turning around the ailing club was to make a 
public share issue. The issue took place in January 1995 and remains one of the 
most successful share issues ever made by a football club, raising £9.4m for the 
Club and creating 10,500 new shareholders.  Despite January being generally 
recognised as a bad month for raising capital the issue was oversubscribed some 
1.8 times. The minimum subscription was £620 per unit, each unit representing 
five ordinary and five preference shares, with the issue price of the ordinary 
shares being £64 per share. Since flotation the share price peaked at £525 per 
share on 6 January 1997. In September 1998 the club carried out a 100 for one 
share split. As at 8 April 1999 the shares were trading at £3.50 per share.  
 
Since McCann’s takeover Celtic has gone from strength to strength, both on and 
off the field. The club won its first Premier Division title in ten years in season 
1997/98 while in season 1998/99 the team played in front of highest number of 
season ticket holders of any British club (52,543), making it the fifth best 
supported team in the world after Barcelona, Real Madrid, Inter Milan and 
Borussia Dortmund. These supporters are all seated in the largest modern 
football stadium in Britain (capacity 60,400), a project completed with no 
mortgage or government funding. Financially the club has reported substantial 
increases in turnover and profits over the last five years (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Five year record (years ended 30 June) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 
Turnover 8,736 10,376 16,005 22,189 27,821 
Profit from operations 282 669 2,735 5,899 5,094 
(Loss)/Profit after tax (1,404) (401) (1,013) 5,152 7,101 
Stadium investment to date 8,694 23,335 34,690 37,011 46,764 
 
Source: Celtic plc Annual Report year ended 30 June 1998 
 
One distinctive factor about the Celtic share issue was that the shares were 
bought almost exclusively by supporters of the club, as opposed to city 
institutions. No formal research has been carried out into the reasons for the high 
take-up of shares by supporters. However, one reason put forward is access 
supporters had to loans from the Co-operative Bank, which it is argued helped 
ensure that it was investors who were looking to the long term who were 
successful in acquiring shares, rather than those seeking to make a quick profit 
(Morrow, 1997b). Other factors, related to the nature of the club’s history and 
community, can also be put forward as possible explanations. 
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One driving force in the emergence of Celtic was the notion of mutual self-help.  
 
Though Celtic emerged as a result of a number of factors, one was this need 
to establish a welfare system for the Catholic Irish-Scots. Community pride 
was an important element in this decision. Spokesmen for the community 
explicitly discussed the need for them to show that they could look after 
themselves, to demonstrate that they were not a drain on the wider 
community’s resources, and to stress their determination to make themselves 
part of Scottish society.  
(Finn, 1991, pp. 388-389). 
 
In terms of the share issue, one interpretation of the willingness of supporters to 
subscribe for shares and the resultant exclusion of outside institutional 
shareholders is that it reflects continuing ‘community pride’ or the desire of the 
community to continue demonstrating their ability to ‘look after themselves’4. 
Related to this is the link between Celtic (supporters) and the Catholic Church 
(Murray, 1984, p. 60; O’Hagan, 1999, p. 12). Bradley (1995, p. 61) found that an 
extraordinary 93% of Celtic supporters are Catholic. Furthermore a large 
majority of Celtic fans (61%) indicated that they attend church/mass at least once 
per week, a higher proportion than for the Catholic population as a whole and 
substantially higher than the figure reported at any other Scottish club (Bradley, 
1995, p. 62).  Given that evidence suggests that Catholics have shown greater 
loyalty to their church than members of other faiths (ONS, 1999, p. 220), it is 
possible that the club’s supporters identified loyalty to Celtic (in terms of 
subscription for shares) as an extension of their loyalty to the Catholic Church. 
 
As was mentioned previously, Celtic’s traditional support was drawn from Irish 
immigrants in Glasgow, immigrants who for the most part were employed in 
unskilled, poorly paid jobs (Gallagher, 1987, p.61). Over time, however, this has 
changed with Murray (1998, p. 208) noting that ‘by the 1960s the success of 
Scotland’s Catholic football club was paralleled by the success of Scottish 
Catholics throughout the business and professional world’. In economic terms, 
therefore, many Celtic supporters would have been no less able than supporters 
of other clubs to afford to subscribe for shares in their club. Furthermore, 
football supporters in general are being drawn from a higher earnings 
background than was previously the case (SNCCFR, 1997). 
 
Fergus McCann arrived at Celtic with a five-year plan, at the end of which he 
promised to sell his shareholding in the club and return to Bermuda. For some 
time he has indicated that his preferred option for selling his stake in the club has 
been to offer those shares for sale among the club’s existing shareholders, season 
ticket holders and other investors interested in the long-term success of the club. 
At present ownership of the club is divided as shown in Table 2: 
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Table 2: Ownership of Celtic plc 
 
Shareholder / Group Percentage holding 
Fergus McCann 50.3% 
Supporters 40.0% 
Dermot Desmond (non-executive 
director) 
5.0% 
John Keane (club director) 3.7% 
Other directors and institutional investors 1.0% 
 
Source: The Scotsman 11 November 1998 
 
McCann’s proposal is interesting, because it is the first time in the new business 
of football that supporters have been offered the opportunity to own a major 
British club in their own right (i.e. not beholden to a majority shareholder such 
as Fergus McCann, irrespective of whether that majority shareholder is also a 
supporter). This has implications with regard to the governance of Celtic, as two 
of the club’s most important stakeholders, the supporters and the providers of 
capital, will become synonymous. It is also interesting because it almost 
certainly involves an unprecedented degree of altruism or philanthropy on the 
part of McCann. Recognised investment logic would indicate that the sale of a 
majority holding as a single stake would be worth far more to the seller than any 
sale which would involve a wide dispersal of that holding, given that the single 
buyer would be prepared to pay a premium for control. 
 
Can such a transfer of shares to the supporters work? At present approximately 
10,500 supporters already own shares in the club. If the argument is accepted 
that for most of these supporters the nature of this investment is essentially non-
financial, i.e. it is of the nature of a community or an emotional investment (see 
also later section on Why be a Stock Exchange listed company?), then it is 
perhaps unlikely that many of these same supporters will wish to subscribe for 
additional shares. Unlike financial investors who gain from owning additional 
shares by receiving additional dividends and/or the benefit of share price 
movements, it might be argued that emotional investors do not receive additional 
benefits by holding additional shares, i.e. the emotional rights attached to owning 
say a hundred shares are no different or greater than those attached to owning 
one share. However, while 10,500 is a very large number of supporter-
shareholders, nevertheless it equates to only approximately 20% of the club’s 
season ticket holders, and to a much smaller percentage still of the club’s world-
wide supporter base. While the club may have its roots in Glasgow’s Irish 
Catholic community, many of those roots have flourished far away from 
Glasgow. 
 
The evidence of participation by the existing supporter-shareholders also bodes 
well for a successful transfer of McCann’s shares. Despite being minority 
shareholders in a company controlled by its Chairman, attendance at the Celtic 
plc AGM in September 1998 was estimated at between 2,500 and 3,500, with the 
meeting lasting almost three hours (McLeman and Shand, 1999). It is also 
interesting to note that approximately 1600 (mostly small) shareholders attended 
Manchester United’s 1998 AGM (Michie, 1998). By way of contrast, attendance 
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at the AGMs of most public limited companies is very low. Such low 
attendances are explained by the fact that the diversified ownership prevalent in 
most UK companies, combined with the privileged access to information 
afforded to large institutional shareholders, means that there is little incentive for 
small shareholders to devote much attention to the monitoring and control of a 
company (Branston, Cowling, Duch Brown, Michie and Sugden, 1999; 
Jenkinson and Mayer, 1992). Given this, it can be argued that the AGM no 
longer provides a means for achieving shareholder democracy (Tricker, 1997). 
Attendance figures at the Celtic and Manchester United AGMs, however, 
somewhat conflict with this view of the role of the AGM. These levels of 
attendance are perhaps further evidence that supporter-shareholders do not think 
of themselves simply as minority owners of financial assets. Instead they see 
themselves as genuine stakeholders in the club, with rights both to receive 
information and to impart it to what they perceive as being their agents, namely 
the directors5. 
 
Some, however, were not in favour of a scheme which would allow the 
supporters the opportunity to own their own club. A high profile consortium, led 
by the former Celtic legend Kenny Dalglish and the former singer with the rock 
group Simple Minds Jim Kerr, and backed by BT Capital European Partners, put 
forward an alternative strategy to takeover Celtic, although no formal bid was 
made for McCann’s shares. Perhaps the most interesting thing about the 
consortium has been not its proposals, but instead the way in which its activities 
have been reported in the (football) press and media. While little analysis has 
taken place of McCann’s proposals, much of the media was quick to champion 
the consortium’s case, despite the fact that it would have seen shares being 
placed with city institutions and financiers. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that much of the sports media were influenced more by the presence of high 
profile personalities in the consortium, than any serious attempt to consider the 
issue of ownership of Celtic. While the celebrities used their high profile to 
influence journalists and reporters, in turn those journalists and reporters used 
their column inches and broadcasts to influence the supporters. Much of the 
press reporting of the consortium’s bid was an example of what Rowe (1991, p. 
88) describes as sports journalism ‘being embedded in, rather than illuminating 
its subject’. 
 
WHY BE A STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY? 
 
In the light of the above comments it is worth asking one further question: 
should such a community resource be a Stock Exchange listed company at all? In 
other words, are there not more appropriate organisational forms for football 
clubs such as Celtic? 
 
The Stock Exchange is usually described as acting as both a primary market and 
as a secondary market. In strict terms, the Exchange is itself a secondary market. 
However, its existence makes the issue of new securities, which can 
subsequently be traded, a more attractive proposition.  
 
The ostensible rationale for football clubs seeking Stock Exchange listings has 
been to raise funds for ground developments, although other reasons put forward 
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in prospectuses issued by British football clubs include the strengthening of 
playing squads, development of commercial operations, investment in youth 
training programmes, widening share ownership, widening supporter share 
ownership, providing increased liquidity to shareholders, reduction of 
borrowings and the provision of additional working capital. The need to fund 
stadium developments is also one of the reasons why German clubs have 
pressurised the Deutsche Fussball-Bund (German Football Federation) to allow 
them to seek market listings (Bowley, 1998). Football club flotations which have 
raised substantial capital for ground developments include those at Manchester 
United, Bolton Wanderers, Charlton Athletic and Preston. Many football clubs, 
however, floated in 1996-97, after their grounds had been redeveloped as a 
consequence of the Taylor Report, redevelopment for which they received 
substantial public money (Football Task Force, 1999).  
 
Advocating a structure other than that of a Stock Exchange listed company 
obviously restricts the ability of clubs to raise funds from that source for future 
capital investment. For football clubs this may not be as great a problem as it 
might first appear. First, irrespective of how it was funded, ground 
redevelopment at most major clubs is now complete. Second, football clubs are 
independent local companies, that independence being required by the rules of 
the football authorities which restrict the extent to which any person or persons 
can own shares in more than one club at the same time. The presence of these 
rules thus restricts the possibility of football clubs making corporate acquisitions 
of the sort found in more conventional business activity (i.e. takeovers of similar 
businesses). Therefore, given the absence at most clubs of a need for funding for 
either large scale capital investment or for corporate acquisitions, one argument 
is that clubs should seek organisational forms which are free from the pressure 
and conflicts that arise out of a Stock Exchange listing and which will at the 
same time encourage them to operate on a sustainable financial basis. 
 
Conn (1997, p. 172) suggests another reason for club flotations, namely allowing 
the clubs’ directors to make large capital gains on their original investment in the 
clubs. Interestingly in the case of Celtic it can be argued that this is not the case. 
The share issue in January 1995 was not accompanied by a market listing and 
involved only the sale of new shares, with no reduction in the holdings of the 
principal shareholder Fergus McCann. Furthermore, it can be argued that his 
decision to offer his majority holding to supporters and season-book holders, 
rather than selling it as a majority shareholding, will earn him a lesser return than 
if he had taken the decision to sell his stake as a controlling shareholding to one 
bidder. However, it should also be noted that Mr McCann will still make a very 
healthy return on his investment. It is also worth remembering that the majority 
of shares in Celtic were bought up by its supporters, as opposed to those groups 
who might normally be expected to provide capital in the market setting, i.e. city 
institutions. 
 
The share issue took place in January 1995. The shares were accepted for listing 
on AIM in September 1995, before becoming listed on the main market in 
September 1998. In its role as a secondary market the Stock Exchange exists to 
provide a market where shares can be traded throughout their lives. The level of 
trading that takes place in shares depends on many factors – the company, the 
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time of the year, market sentiment etc. Nevertheless there is evidence that shares 
in several football clubs are very thinly traded (Morrow, 1999, pp. 98-103). In 
the case of Celtic plc, Tables 3 and 4 indicate that there is very little evidence of 
trading taking place in its shares. 
 
Table 3 shows the turnover in Celtic plc shares prior to the share split in 
September 1998. However, it must be noted that the figures have been adjusted 
for subsequent capital changes (i.e. these figures are as if the 100 for 1 share split 
that took place on 21 September 1998 had already taken place). 
 
Table 3: Trading volume in Celtic plc shares (15 May 1997 -          
16 September 1998) 
 
Volume measure Daily 
average 
Details 
Number of trades 4.67 This is the total number of times shares were traded 
in the day, as recorded by SEAQ.  
Turnover by volume 7,037 This shows the number of shares traded for a stock 
on a particular day.  
Turnover by volume as a 
percentage of number of 
shares in issue 
0.02%  
Turnover by value £18,459 Average daily trading volume multiplied by adjusted 
price (adjusted for subsequent capital actions) 
 
Number of shares in issue 29,000,000 
 
Source: Datastream, Company accounts 
 
Notwithstanding that the figures in Table 3 are reported after adjustment for 
subsequent capital actions, the level of trading was based on the share capital 
prior to the share split. Prior to the split there were only 290,000 shares in issue, 
of which just over half were held by Fergus McCann, with the quoted price of 
these shares being measured in hundreds of pounds. It could be argued, 
therefore, that the extremely low levels of trading reported in Celtic shares may 
have been caused by two factors: first, the high price of those shares, and second, 
the low number of shares in issue. 
 
Prior to its admittance to the Official List the club carried out a 100 for 1 share 
split. One of the motives behind share splits is to increase the liquidity and 
marketability of the company’s shares. Table 4 shows the turnover in Celtic plc 
shares subsequent to the share split and the listing of Celtic shares on the Official 
List. 
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Table 4:  Trading volume in Celtic plc shares (21 September 1998 –           
8 April 1999) 
 
Volume measure Daily average 
Number of bargains 14.1 
Turnover by volume 14,717 
Turnover by volume as a percentage of number of shares in issue 0.05% 
Turnover by value £46,522 
 
Source: London Stock Exchange Electronic Data Services, Company accounts 
 
As would be expected, higher turnover figures are reported for the latter period. 
However, the figures reported are still extremely low compared to other 
companies. In addition, higher trading might have been expected given the 
presence of a predatory consortium during that period. For comparative 
purposes, Table 5 shows trading volume data for the same period for three other 
leisure companies, including the football sector’s red chip stock, Manchester 
United.  
 
Table 5:  Trading volumes in leisure shares: daily averages (21 
September 1998 –  8 April 1999) 
 
 Number of 
trades 
Turnover by 
volume 
Turnover by 
volume as a 
percentage of 
number of 
shares in issue 
Turnover by 
value 
Manchester 
United 
49.0 628,438 0.25% £1,349,158 
Rank 132.3 2,715,349 0.35% £5,973,814 
Ladbroke 268.1 5,812,489 0.49% £12,883,610 
 
Source: Datastream, Company accounts 
 
Taken together, Tables 3 and 4 indicate that shares in Celtic plc are extremely 
thinly traded. It has been suggested that the majority of supporters who bought 
shares in Celtic plc as a result of the public offer invested for community or 
emotional reasons rather than financial reasons, i.e. the supporters are interested 
in psychic income rather than financial income. Given this profile of 
shareholders, the turnover figures are unsurprising. The evidence does, however, 
further beg the question of why a company such as Celtic should be a Stock 
Exchange listed company at all. 
 
OTHER ORGANISATIONAL FORMS 
 
As was mentioned previously, the philosophical antecedents of stakeholder 
theory can be traced to the conceptions of the co-operative movement and 
mutuality. In this section the appropriateness of mutual and co-operative 
ownership structures to contemporary football clubs will be briefly considered. 
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(For a more detailed discussion of alternative ownership models see Bourke, 
1999; Branston et al., 1999; Michie, 1999; Michie and Ramalingam, 1999).  
 
Mutuality 
 
Recent discussion on mutuality has primarily focused on its demise in the 
financial services sector, as witnessed by the high profile demutualisation of 
many building societies and more recently of life assurance providers such as 
Scottish Widows. While the demise of mutuality in the financial services sector 
mirrors earlier decline in other sectors such as the retail market, mutuals and co-
operatives continue to provide a significant share of the services we rely on most 
such as childcare, insurance, food provision and agriculture (Leadbeater and 
Christie, 1999). Thus while the nature of the financial services industry may 
mean that mutuality is no longer appropriate for all providers in that market, 
equally there has been a realisation in other areas of activity that new forms of 
mutual structure may be appropriate where the primary aim of the product or 
activity is not to generate a financial return or where a community need is being 
met (Jaquiss, 2000). As Michie (1999) notes, structuring football clubs as mutual 
organisations seems to be particularly appropriate given that a club can be 
defined in economic terms (using the 1996 definition by Cornes and Sandler) as: 
 
…a voluntary group of individuals who derive mutual benefit from sharing 
one or more of the following: production costs, the members’ characteristics, 
or a good characterised by excludable benefits (cited in Michie, 1999, p.17) 
 
In a mutual business, ownership is achieved through active participation in the 
business. The members are the owners and have voting rights, but no tradeable 
financial asset exists. Many sporting clubs continue to be run as mutual 
organisations, with the Spanish club Barcelona being perhaps the most 
prominent example. Barcelona is a not-for-profit association owned by its 
104,000 members. Any surplus made is reinvested directly into the club. Three 
other Spanish clubs, Real Madrid, Athletico Bilbao and Osasuna also operate as 
not-for-profit associations. Mutual sports organisations also have a long history 
in other countries, notably Germany, although it should be noted that German 
football clubs have recently received approval from the Deutsche Fussball-Bund 
(DFB) to allow them to drop their mutual status and become publicly listed 
companies. This change reflects an acceptance by the DFB of the German clubs’ 
argument that they needed access to stock markets in order to allow them to 
compete on equal terms with their European rivals.  
 
In the case of a football club, ownership would be conferred on the club’s active 
supporters. With no outside shareholders, any surplus or profit made can be 
reinvested in the club. In this way one of the most prominent stakeholder 
conflicts which exists within listed football clubs, namely the tension between 
supporters and providers of financial capital, is effectively eliminated.  
 
Michie and Ramalingam (1999) identify benefits of the mutual form, two of 
which are of particular relevance to football clubs: first, that mutuality is a more 
efficient way of dealing with agency problems, and second, that mutuality is a 
source of social welfare.  
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In a mutual, agency problems are resolved by the fact that as members can 
simply withdraw their funds this acts as a discipline on management. However, 
the loyalty of supporters makes the exercising of such ‘exit’ discipline unlikely 
(Michie and Ramalingam, 1999). The nature of football club investment, as 
discussed throughout this paper, and in particular as evidenced in the low levels 
of trading reported in shares in Celtic plc, backs up this view that supporters are 
unlikely to exercise such exit discipline (see also McMaster, 1997, and Morrow, 
1999, p. 88). However, instead of exit discipline it is argued that what is 
described as the power of ‘voice’ could act as an equally rigorous discipline on 
management (Michie and Ramalingam, 1999). Evidence presented earlier in this 
paper as to the levels of attendance and participation at football club AGMs 
provides some credence for this argument6.  The power of ‘voice’ at present, 
however, is limited within many modern football corporations. What mutual 
status may provide is an opportunity for the ‘voice’ to become more effective in 
the governance process by ensuring that it is heard within a more democratic 
structure7.  
 
With regard to social relationships, it is argued that mutual forms of ownership 
can be advantageous in that such businesses (building societies being the obvious 
example) are better able to sustain long term relationships with customers 
(Michie and Ramalingam, 1999). Given that the relationship between a supporter 
and his or her club is essentially an issue of identity and is therefore a long-term 
relationship, it can be argued that the mutual form of ownership is thus very 
appropriate for football clubs. 
 
In practice, however, given the market capitalisation of many top clubs 
(including Celtic), it may be difficult to convert SE listed companies into 
mutuals. However, evidence presented in this paper suggests that many Celtic 
shareholders do not view their shareholding as a financial investment in any 
conventional sense. If other like-minded supporters were to subscribe for those 
shares presently held by Fergus McCann, then conversion to mutual status may 
not be entirely unrealistic. Furthermore, the exchange of shares for ownership or 
membership of their club is likely to be more palatable to football club 
shareholders than to conventional shareholders: altruism is not the sole preserve 
of Fergus McCann. Nevertheless, the practical difficulties of such a conversion, 
not least how it would be financed, should not be underestimated - the best route 
to becoming a mutual is unlikely to begin at a plc structure8. 
 
An alternative and perhaps more practicable way of allowing supporters to 
exercise their ‘voice’ is through part of a club’s share capital being held by a 
Trust on behalf of the supporters. Such trusts already exist at Bournemouth and 
Northampton Town9. Trusts preserve the principle of mutuality as they provide 
for the sharing of the ownership of property and operate on a one-member one-
vote basis. One reaction to the decision by the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry to block BSkyB’s bid for Manchester United was an announcement by 
the campaign group Supporters United Against Murdoch (SUAM) that it 
intended to seek a meeting with the Manchester United plc board to discuss the 
possibility of setting up some kind of trust to combine the holding of individual 
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fans (Crick, 1999). To that end SUAM also advised its members to go out and 
buy as many shares in the club as they can. 
 
Co-operatives 
 
An alternative organisational form, also based on the principle of mutuality, is 
that of the co-operative. A co-operative can be defined as ‘an autonomous 
association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, 
and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically 
controlled enterprise’ (ICA, 1996). Co-operatives are characterised by: 
 
 Mutuality - conduct of the business must be for the mutual benefit of the 
members, with the benefits they receive deriving mainly from their 
participation in the business 
 The principle of one member, one vote: control of the co-operative must be 
vested in the members equally 
 Fair distribution of profits: profits, if distributable, will be distributed in 
relation to the extent members have either traded with the co-operative or 
taken part in its business. 
 
The aim of a co-operative is to ensure a genuine community interest among the 
co-operative’s members, with that interest being based on something deeper than 
the amount of financial capital they have placed in that organisation (Bourke, 
1999). The nature and importance of a football club’s community (both direct 
and indirect) was discussed earlier in this paper. A club’s community is vital to 
its future success. Adoption of a co-operative structure would introduce 
democracy into football clubs, i.e. it would provide all of a club’s members (or 
stakeholders) with a say in the running of the club. Thus it would ensure that 
those who are most important to the club’s future long-term success, its 
supporters and also its players, are actively involved in running their club and 
planning its future. Interestingly, sports (including professional football clubs) 
were identified in Tuck’s 1981 typology of industries and services most suitable 
for co-operative development (cited in Clarke, 1984). 
 
It is important to highlight the fact that running a football club as a co-operative 
does not mean that it would not be run as a business. The important distinction 
between a co-operative and a non-cooperative is what happens to the profits 
made by that business: while profits in a non-cooperative would be distributed to 
shareholders, in a co-operative where the objectives of the members are defined 
in terms of footballing objectives, those profits would be retained in the co-
operative.  
 
The experience of plc co-operatives in the Irish dairy industry may be 
informative for football clubs. One argument in favour of Stock Exchange listing 
as opposed to co-operative or mutual status is that it makes it easier to raise 
capital. Faced with the problem of requiring to raise capital to fund 
modernisation and expansion in a competitive market place, while wishing also 
to maintain co-operative ownership by their farmer-suppliers, the dairy co-
operatives adopted a hybrid structure of co-operative plc status. This involved 
the creation of Stock Exchange quoted subsidiaries with full plc status but which 
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remained under the control of the members of the co-operatives (Bourke, 1999). 
The challenge for football clubs would be to reach the same point but from the 
other direction, i.e. to move from a corporate structure in which control is vested 
in the hands of one or a few individuals or institutional shareholders, to one 
which allows the club’s supporters (who are equivalent to the farmers) to assume 
control. However, as was mentioned in the discussion on mutuality, the practical 
difficulties of such a conversion, not least its financing, should not be 
underestimated.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Football clubs are classic stakeholder organisations. Various groups other than a 
club’s shareholders believe that de facto they have ownership rights in their club. 
Conflicts between stakeholders, however, are likely, particularly between 
supporters (who may or may not also be shareholders) whose objectives are 
essentially in terms of football and shareholders (professional investors) who to a 
large extent are motivated by the prospect of a financial return. Such conflicts 
have been apparent at several clubs, most noticeably at Manchester United and 
Newcastle United, and might be thought of as inevitable where a club becomes a 
Stock Exchange listed company.  
 
In this paper, however, the case of Stock Exchange listed Celtic plc has been 
used, not to demonstrate conflict between stakeholders, but instead to question 
the appropriateness of market listing for contemporary football clubs. In the case 
of Celtic there already exists a high degree of overlap between the stakeholder 
groups of supporters and shareholders, with the potential to further increase this 
overlap in the near future. One consequence arising out of this ownership 
framework is that very little trading takes place in shares in Celtic plc. Although 
this lack of market activity is unsurprising, it provides further evidence that 
Stock Exchange listed companies are not the most appropriate vehicles for 
contemporary stakeholder-focused football clubs. What is required for football 
clubs is a structure which more fully captures both the economic and the social 
aspects of contemporary football clubs and allows for a more inclusive concept 
of ownership. While mutual and co-operative structures have much to commend 
them, given the market value of many top clubs the most practicable way 
forward is likely to involve the formation of supporters’ trusts operating on 
mutual principles within the existing corporate structure. 
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1 Restrictions on the mobility of football players arising out of the operation of the football 
transfer system were challenged by a Belgian player, Jean Marc Bosman, in an action raised 
against his club and the footballing authorities. In a landmark ruling the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities held that the provision that out-of-contract football players could only 
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move between two clubs if compensation was paid to the selling club was incompatible with 
Article 48 of the EC Treaty (CJEC, 1995). (For a more detailed consideration of the case, see 
Griffith-Jones, 1997, pp. 126-133 or Morris, Morrow and Spink, 1996.) 
2 See Michie (1998) for evidence of stakeholder dissatisfaction with the bid.  
3 During the year ended 30 June 1998, the Celtic Charity Fund raised over £120,000 to be 
distributed among worthy causes (Celtic plc 1998 Annual Report). 
4 The link between the incoming Irish and the idea of mutual self-help evidences itself elsewhere. 
For example, Donnelly and Haggert (1997) identify the influence of the Irish in Scotland as being 
one reason why the Credit Union movement has been so much more successful in Scotland than 
in England and Wales. In terms of political beliefs, evidence also suggests that Celtic fans 
continue to be supporters of the Labour Party to a significantly larger extent than fans of any 
other Scottish club (Bradley, 1995, p. 69).  
5 The determination of small supporter-shareholders to participate in the operation of their club 
was well illustrated at the Celtic plc 1998 AGM. Notwithstanding the existence of an individual 
majority shareholder, numerous shareholders spoke against an apparently uncontroversial 
resolution (common in most public limited companies) that the directors should be allowed to 
disapply statutory pre-emption rights in respect of allotment of shares for cash, before forcing a 
vote on the issue.  
6 The importance of ‘voice’ was evident at the Celtic plc 1998 AGM, attended by approximately 
2500 shareholders (McLeman and Shand, 1998). Reports in the Scottish broadsheet press 
included descriptions such as ‘a tempestuous agm’, ‘sustained abuse’, ‘McCann who was also the 
subject of barracking as well as receiving a standing ovation’, ‘pandemonium at Celtic Park’ and 
‘Democracy … in football is not a pretty sight’.  (See for example ‘Brown defies calls to quit’, 
‘McCann and Brown cast as villains in Parkhead melodrama’, The Scotsman, 15 September 
1998). 
7 Mutuality does not, however, guarantee democracy. For example, L’Elefant Blau, an 
organisation set up by members of FC Barcelona, has as its primary goal the democratisation of 
FC Barcelona. Among other things it is critical of the process by which the members entitled to 
attend the Assembly of Delegates (the highest government body of the club) are selected, and of 
the accountability of the club’s directors to its members (L’Elefant Blau, 1999). 
8 For a discussion on the feasibility of applying the mutual concept in practice, see Michie (1999, 
p. 19). 
9 At the 1999 Labour Party conference the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, the 
Rt. Hon. Chris Smith MP announced a Government initiative to help give supporters a say in the 
running of their football clubs by forming mutual trusts. Supporters Direct was subsequently 
launched in January 2000 to provide assistance to supporters who wish to form trusts. 
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